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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On October 21, 2015, defendants petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for permission
to appeal an interlocutory order of the district court. On October 23, 2015, the Utah
Supreme Court assigned the petition to the Utah Court of Appeals. On November 18, 2015,
the Utah Court of Appeals granted the defendants' petition. As such, this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)U).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court properly determined that defendants were precluded
withholding certain documents from discovery pursuant to the statutory care review and
peer review privileges where defendants admittedly (1) failed to produce a full and
complete privilege log that identified all of the documents which defendants were
withholding pursuant to the privileges, and (2) failed to satisfy all of the foundational
requirements necessary to assert the privilege, even though defendants had eighteen
months within which to produce the required log and foundational evidence.
The standard of review for evaluating whether the district court properly determined
that defendants failed to satisfy the prerequisites necessary to invoke the statutory care
review and peer review privileges is the "abuse of discretion" standard. See Dahl v. Dahl,
2015 UT 23,163, 345 P.3d 566 ("As a general rule, we grant district courts a great deal of
deference in matters of discovery and review discovery orders for abuse of discretion.").

4
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PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and condition
of persons to designated agencies - Immunity from liability.
A copy of this statute is attached to Appellants' Brief as Addendum 1.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3. Information considered privileged communications.
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data furnished
by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in
any legal proceeding of any kind or character.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l). Discovery scope. In general.
Parties may discover any' matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or
defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportion? 1=~ •. set forth
;g of any
below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable or admissible in any prot
kind or character include all information in any form provided during and created
specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, findings, or
conclusions of peer review, care review, or quality assurance processes of any organization
of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act for the purpose
of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the quality of
medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence, or professional
conduct of any health care provider.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

On October 10, 2013, plaintiffEldad Vered, M.D., filed a complaint in Utah's Third
(fl,

District Court against Mountain West Medical Center ("MWMC" or "the hospital"), the
Executive Committee of MWMC's Medical Staff and two individual nurses, Tracy
Schaeffer and Yvonne Nielson (collectively "the defendants''). (R. at 1). The complaint
5
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generally alleged that Dr. Vered was the victim of a systematic plan to damage his
reputation in the hope that MWMC would ultimately revoke Dr. Vered's hospital
privileges. (R. at 5). For example, Dr. Vered claimed that hospital employees began
soliciting and personally making false and slanderous complaints against him to the
Medical Staffs Executive Committee and to MWMC's CEO. (Id.). Dr. Vered further
alleged that the hospital and the Executive Committee wrongfully caused him to enter into
a behavioral agreement without first providing him a fair hearing, as required the Medical
Staff Bylaws. (R. at 9-11 ). Based on the foregoing, Dr. Vered sued the defendants for
breach of contract, defamation and interference with economic relations. (R. at 12-15).
On April 30, 2014, Dr. Vered filed an amended complaint which included additional
allegations stating that he had been forced to resign from MWMC's Medical Staff on
December 24, 2013 as a result of the hostile and toxic environment that had been created
at the hospital. (R. at 153-54). The amended complaint also contained additional claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and employment discrimination under Title
VII. (R. at 160-62).

On February 28, 2014, Dr. Vered served the defendants with his First Set of
Discovery Requests. (R. at 458). On April 25, 2014, after receiving several extensions of
time, the defendants served their objections, answers and responses to these requests. (Id.).
Several disputes eventually arose regarding the defendants' discovery responses. As a
result, Dr. Vered filed a Statement of Discovery Issues on September 3, 2014, in which he
requested the court to intervene in the parties' dispute. (R. at 330-33).
6
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The district court held a hearing on Dr. Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues on
October 6, 2014. (R. at 926-42). After hearing arguments from both sides, the district
court ultimately agreed with Dr. Vered's arguments and ordered the defendants to produce
all of the discovery requested by Dr. Vered within fourteen days (R. at 935). The district
court also ordered the defendants to reimburse Dr. Vered for the reasonable attorneys' fees
he incurred in connection with the Statement of Discovery Issues. (Id.).
On October 17, 2014, the defendants moved the district court to reconsider its order
from the October 6, 2014 hearing.

(R. at 4 70-72).

The motion for reconsideration

eventually came on for hearing on August 24, 2015. (R. at 656-700). After hearing
arguments from both sides, the district court affirmed its prior ruling and ordered the
defendants to produce all of the documents requested by Dr. Vered in his discovery
requests. (R. at 673-74). The district court subsequently entered a written order on October
1, 2015, that memorialized its prior oral ruling. (R. at 741-44).
On October 21, 2015, defendants filed a petition with the Utah Supreme Court
seeking permission to appeal the district court's ruling on Dr. Vered's Statement of
Discovery Issues. (R. at 1204-76). Defendants also filed a motion with the district court
seeking to stay the proceedings pending an appeal, which the district court granted on
December 28, 2015. (R. at 1277-87; 1715-18). The Utah Supreme Court eventually
assigned the defendants' petition to this Court on October 23, 2015. (R. at 1409-12). This
Court then granted the defendants' petition on November 18, 2015.

7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II.

RELEVANT FACTS

A.

Background

Dr. Vered is a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist ("OB/GYN") who owns
(I}

and operates a medical practice in Tooele, Utah. (R. at 141; 169). In order to perform
procedures for his patients, e.g., baby deliveries and other women's health procedures, it is
necessary for Dr. Vered to have hospital privileges at one or more hospitals so that he can
have access to the necessary surgical facilities and equipment.

(R. at 141-42; 170).

Mountain West Medical Center is the only hospital located in Tooele County, Utah. (R. at
142; 170). Therefore, Dr. Vered obtained hospital privileges at MWMC and was a member
of the hospital's Medical Staff from 2008 through 2013. (Id.).
On October 10, 2013, Dr. Vered filed this action in Third District Court for Tooele
County against MWMC, the Executive Committee ofMWMC's Medical Staff and two of
the hospital's nurses. (R. at 1-96). As part of his lawsuit, Dr. Vered alleged that beginning
in June 2012, he became the victim of a systematic plan to damage his reputation in the
hope that MWMC would ultimately revoke his hospital privileges. (R. at 144). Dr. Vered
claimed that the plan was motivated by two factors: (1) a desire by the hospital's
administration to have Dr. Vered's patients transfer their care to OB/GYNs employed
directly by Mountain West, and (2) a discriminatory animus toward Dr. Vered based on his
Israeli origin, Jewish faith, male gender and age. (Id.).
Dr. Vered claimed that beginning in June 2012, defendant Tracy Schaffer began
soliciting and personally making numerous false and slanderous complaints against Dr.
8
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Vered to the Medical Staffs Executive Committee and to MWMC's CEO, Tim Moran.
(R. at 144-46).

Defendant Yvonne Nielson, is claimed to have substantiated these false

complaints to Mr. Moran. (R. at 145-46). Dr. Vered further alleges that after receiving
these complaints, Mr. Moran conducted general staff meetings during which labor and
delivery nurses were encouraged to reveal and make any formal written complaints they
may have against Dr. Vered and to share and gossip what they may have heard about Dr.
Vered, his demeanor and/or his medical judgment. (R. at 146). Dr. Vered was not present
at these meetings and therefore he was unaware of the allegations being made against him
and was denied an opportunity to explain or defend himself against the allegations. (Id.).
Dr. Vered believes that Mr. Moran's decision to conduct the aforementioned staff
meetings was.not motivated by a desire to ensure quality patient care. (Id.). Rather, he
believes that Mr. Moran was motivated by a desire to increase MWMC's revenue and
profits. (Id.). Specifically, it is alleged that Mr. Moran intended to use the false complaints
against Dr. Vered as a basis upon which to convince the Medical Staff to revoke Dr.
Vered's hospital privileges. (Id.). Once Dr. Vered's privileges were revoked, Mr. Moran
anticipated that all of Dr. Vered's patients would then transfer their care to another
OB/GYN that was employed directly by the hospital. (Id.).
The lawsuit alleges that in September 2013, the Medical Staffs Executive
Committee ("MEC") conducted an investigation into the allegations that had been made
against Dr. Vered by Ms. Schaffer and others. (R. at 147). Dr. Vered claims that he
subsequently met with the MEC to discuss the allegations and that he denied acting
9
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inappropriately during any of the incidents referenced in the complaints. (Id.). However,
Dr. Vered also claims that he was never given an opportunity to confront any of his
accusers or to review any of the evidence which the MEC gathered during its investigation.
(Id.).

On September 28, 2013, Dr. Vered received a letter from the MEC stating that the
MEC had voted "to require you to execute the enclosed Behavioral Agreement." (R. at 92;
149). However, the letter did not state whether the MEC found any evidence to either
substantiate or refute the allegations that were made against Dr. Vered. (R. at 92). In fact,
the letter did not allege that Dr. Vered had engaged in any improper conduct at all. (Id.).
Rather, it stated that "[f]ailure to return a signed copy of the Behavioral Agreement as
provided herein will result in immediate referral of this matter to the MEC for consideration
of additional corrective action .... " (/d.).
~

The MEC's proposed behavioral agreement required Dr. Vered (i) to refrain from
making derogatory or unprofessional comments to nurses and other employees, (ii) to be
continuously available in order to provide care for hospitalized patients when providing
call coverage for the Emergency Department, (iii) to complete all medical records in a
timely manner, and (iv) to refrain from retaliating against any individuals who submitted
complaints against him.

The agreement also required Dr. Vered to allow "certain

monitoring activities" by the MEC and its representatives. (R. at 93-95).
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The behavioral agreement also contained the following provision that required Dr.
Vered to waive certain due process in the event the behavioral agreement was subsequently
violated:
Physician specifically acknowledges that summary suspension may be an
appropriate remedy should a violation by him of any term of this Agreement
meet the standard for summary suspension under the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act. Physician further understands that any due process rights
resulting from such corrective action shall be limited to the issue of whether
Physician failed to comply with this Agreement, and shall be resolved
pursuant to the policies and procedures set forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws
and the Fair Hearing Plan.

(R. at 95).
Dr. Vered claims that the MEC's proposed agreement violated the Medical Staff
Bylaws because the MEC failed to provide Dr. Vered with the opportunity for a fair hearing
before imposing the agreement on him. (R. at 151 ). Nevertheless, Dr. Vered alleges that
members of the Medical Staff told him that he would be summarily suspended and that his
medical privileges would be revoked ifhe refused to sign the agreement. (Id.). Therefore,
feeling coerced, Dr. Vered signed the behavioral agreement on November 1, 2013. (R. at
152).
Dr. Vered alleges that that after he signed the behavioral agreement, the atmosphere
within the hospital and the demeanor of the hospital's nurses became unbearable and
threatened to affect the quality of care he provided to his patients. (R. at 153 ). For example,
Dr. Vered states that nurses and staff members refused to communicate with him in an
effective manner and would openly criticize him in front of his patients. (Id.). As a result,
11
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Dr. Vered submitted his resignation to the Medical Staff on December 16, 2013, stating
that he was resigning effective January 1, 2014. (Id.).
On December 23, 2013, seven days after submitting his resignation letter, Dr. Vered
received a letter from MWMC stating that he had recently violated the behavioral
agreement and that the hospital would be justified in seeking the immediate suspension of
his privileges prior to the effective date of his resignation. (R. at 153-54). Dr. Vered claims
that the new allegations against him were false. (R. at 154). Nevertheless, Dr. Vered was
concerned about the threatened suspension because any disciplinary action taken against
him prior to his resignation would be reportable to the National Practitioners Data Bank,
which requires hospitals to report any instances where a physician resigns from a medical
staff while disciplinary proceedings against him are pending. (Id.).
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Vered felt he had no choice but to resign from the
ii}

MWMC Medical Staff immediately. (Id.). Therefore, on December 24, 2013, Dr. Vered
resigned from the Medical Staff and surrendered his privileges effective immediately.

(Id.).
Dr. Vered initially sued the defendants for breach of contract, defamation and
interference with economic relations. (R. at 12-15). He subsequently filed an amended
complaint which contained additional claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and employment discrimination under Title VII. (R. at 160-62).

12
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B.

Dr. Vered's Discovery Requests

On February 28, 2014, Dr. Vered served the defendants with his First Set of
Discovery Requests, which included the following requests for production of documents:
REQUEST NO. 1: All
documents
contained
in
Dr.
Vered's
personnel/medical staff file(s) in the possession of Mountain West Medical
Center ("Hospital") and/or the Medical Executive Committee of the Medical
Staff of Mountain West Medical Center ("MEC"), including, but not limited
to documents relating to all reviews, evaluations, grievances, complaints or
investigations concerning Dr. Vered.
REQUEST NO. 2: Any and all copies of memoranda, correspondence,
notes, emails, electronically stored or generated information or other
documents relating to the decision by the MEC and the Hospital to present
Dr. Vered with the Behavioral Agreement that he signed in November 2013.
REQUEST NO. 3: Any and all copies of memoranda, correspondence,
notes, emails or other electronically stored or generated information
concerning Dr. Vered that were written by or that are in the possession of the
individual defendants, members of the MEC and/or Hospital employees,
including its Chief Executive Officer.

(R. at 458-59).
On April 25, 2014, after receiving several extensions of time, the defendants served
their objections, answers and responses to these requests. (R. at 452-65). A review of
these responses shows that the defendants actually agreed to produce very little
information. Rather, the vast majority of defendants' responses consisted of objections in
which they refused to provide the requested information on the grounds that it was, inter

alia, privileged information that was protected from discovery by the peer review and care
review privilege codified at Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3. (R. at 458-59). In fact, defendants
specifically objected to the three foregoing requests for production on the grounds that they
13
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sought privileged information. (Id.). Still, the defendants further responded to Request
Nos. 1 and 2 by agreeing to produce "any non-privileged and responsive documents." (Id.).
However, defendants refused to provide any documents in response to Request No. 3. (Id.).
On June 18, 2014, Dr. Vered's counsel sent a letter to defendants' counsel which
outlined the reasons he believed many of defendants' objections were incorrect. (R. at 47781). With respect to the defendants' assertion of the peer review/care review privileges,
Dr. Vered's counsel stated as follows:
As discussed earlier, the care review privilege only applies to
documents prepared specifically to be submitted for review purposes. As
such, the privilege does not apply to any documents that may have
precipitated any peer review of Dr. Vered, such as written complaints or
emails between staff members. Nor do they apply to emails or other
communications between MEC members that were not drafted specifically
to be included in the peer review file. Furthermore, since we have only asked
for documents which concern Dr. Vered, such information is relevant to this
dispute.
Based on the foregoing, I feel it is appropriate for the defendants to
produce a privilege log of all documents in their possession that fall within
the scope [of] this request and to describe such documents with sufficient
particularity so as to allow us to determine whether or not such documents
fall within the care review privilege. Please let me know if you are agreeable
to this compromise
(R. at 4 79). Dr. Vered' s counsel ended his letter by telling defendants' counsel to "[p]lease
feel free to give me a call if you would like to discuss your objections in more detail." (R.
at 480).
Defendants' counsel did not call Dr. Vered's counsel to discuss the issues raised in
the July 18 letter. Rather, defendants' counsel responded with a letter dated July 1, 2014,
14
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wherein he discussed his understanding of the care review privilege. (R. at 466-69). As
part of this letter, defendants' counsel stated that the defendants would supplement their
response to Request No. 3 and would "produce for inspection any non-privileged and
responsive documents without waiving their objections" if Dr. Vered would agree to a
stipulated protective order. (R. at 468). However, this letter was not accompanied by any
privilege log that identified the documents that defendants were withholding pursuant to
the peer/care review privilege.
The parties were eventually able to agree to a stipulated protective order that was
signed by the district court on August 4, 2014. (R. at 305-25). Dr. Vered' s counsel
subsequently contacted defendants' counsel several times for the purpose of asking when
Dr. Vered could expect to receive the documents that defendants previously agreed to
produce in their discovery responses and in their counsel's July 1, 2014 letter. For example,
Dr. Vered's counsel sent emails to defendants' counsel on August 8, 13 and 28 and again
on September 2. (R. at 331-32). Despite these many attempts, defendants still refused to
provide a date on which Dr. Vered could expect to receive defendants' documents. (Id.).
Based on the defendants' dilatory conduct and their refusal to provide any
documents whatsoever, Dr. Vered filed a Statement of Discovery Issues on September 3,
2014 pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-502(2). (R. at 330-33).
Specifically, Dr. Vered requested an order that required the defendants to produce "all
documents and things which defendants agreed to produce in their responses to Plaintiffs
First Set of Requests for Production of Documents" and "all documents and things

15
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requested in Dr. Vered's First Set of Requests for Production which defendants said they
would not produce without an appropriate protective order being entered by the Court."
(R. at 331).
On September 11, 2014, the defendants filed a response to Dr. Vered's Statement
of Discovery Issues. (R. at 336-42). This response acknowledged that defendants had still
not provided any documents in response to Dr. Vered's previous requests, despite having
had over six months to compile the documents. (R. at 337). Moreover, defendants'
response did not identify which documents they still intended to produce.

Rather,

defendants argued that "[t]he bulk of the information Plaintiff seeks is 'not subject to
discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding' because it is protected by
the care review privilege."' (R. at 338). Defendants' response then proceeded to discuss
the peer review privilege codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 26-25-3 and why it applied to the
I}

documents requested by the defendants. (R. at 339). In other words, it was the defendants
that first chose to raise the care/peer review privilege as a defense to Dr. Vered's Statement
of Discovery Issues.
After receiving the defendants' response, the district court scheduled a hearing on
Dr. Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues for October 6, 2014. (R. at 368-69). Then, on
September 30, 2014, the defendants finally provided Dr. Vered with a "privilege log" that
purportedly identified the documents which defendants were withholding pursuant to the
care/peer review privileges. (R. at 474-75). In other words, the privilege log was not
provided until seven months after the discovery requests were originally served and only
16
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four business days prior to the hearing. Moreover, the privilege log did not describe the
documents listed therein with any degree of particularity so as to allow Dr. V ered to
determine whether such documents were protected by the care/peer review privileges.
Rather, the log simply listed what each document was (e.g., letter, email, etc.), the
document's date, the creator, the recipient and a very brief description of the document.
(R. at 423-32).

At the hearing on his Statement of Discovery Issues, Dr. Vered challenged the
sufficiency of the defendants' privilege log, which had been produced only four business
days earlier. (R. at 929-30). Specifically, Dr. Vered argued that the log simply identified
the documents being withheld and did not contain an affidavit or some other evidence to
allow an individualized assessment as to the applicability of the privilege:
We did get a privilege log. However, your Honor, I think it's
important to note a couple things.
First of all, there's a case which is cited, I believe, in the defendant's
paper here today called Wilson v. IHC Hospital. It lays out very clearly what
the healthcare review privilege is. What it really - first part of it I'd like to
address is the part that says the party asserting the privilege - I'm quoting
here from Wilson. The party asserting the privilege must provide a, quote,
"adequate evidentiary basis to show that the documents were specifically
prepared to be submitted for review purposes."
If you read that case, what they say is that you need to submit an
affidavit or some other witness testimony to show that the documents that
you're claiming as a privilege really fall within that privilege, and we haven't
received that at all. All we've received - and I can show you the list, but
essentially we did not receive any affidavits, just a list of documents, date of
the document, who wrote it, [and] we're not producing it because it's under
the peer privilege.
(R. at 929-30).
17
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At the conclusion of hearing, the district court agreed with Dr. Vered's argument
regarding the insufficiency of defendants' privilege log and ordered the defendants to
produce all of the documents that Dr. Vered had requested in his discovery requests,
including those documents that were being withheld pursuant to the peer review privilege:
The Court is ordering that all of the discovery requested is ordered produced.
The defendants have 14 days to produce that. The Court is finding that there
has not been an adequate evidentiary basis to show that the documents were
specifically prepared to be submitted for the review purposes, and is ordering
that all of the documents be produced.
(R. at 935).
On October 17, 2014, the defendants moved the district court to reconsider the
aforementioned decision.

(R. at 470-72; 433-51).

The defendants' motion was

accompanied by a revised privilege log, as well as an affidavit from MWMC's Quality
Director, Joleen Perez, which purported to provide an evidentiary basis for the privilege.
(R. at 410-32). However, the defendants also admitted that even this revised privilege log
did not identify all of the documents they were withholding from discovery. Specifically,
defendants stated as follows:
[T]he privilege log attached as Exhibit 1 to Ms. Perez's Affidavit does not
contain all the documents in Dr. Vered's credentialing and quality file, let
alone all responsive but privileged documents. The contents in the privilege
log are an accurate representation of the types of privileged documents that
are in Dr. Vered's credentialing and quality file and some other privileged
documents that are, absent a privilege, responsive to Dr. Vered's discovery.
With that being said, Defendants can supplement this privilege log should it
be necessary.

18
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(R. at 448). In other words, despite having been served with Dr. Vered's discovery requests
eight months earlier, and despite receiving an adverse ruling from the district court, the
defendants still failed to provide Dr. Vered with a full and complete privilege log that
would allow the district court to determine which documents the defendants were
withholding.
Due to a glitch in the district court's scheduling system, the defendants' motion for
reconsideration did not come on for hearing until August 24, 2015, more than ten months
after it was filed. 1 (R. at 656-700). Despite having this additional ten months to revise
their privilege log such that it contained a full and complete list of the items being withheld,
defendants did not submit any supplemental logs.

Moreover, while defendants had

submitted an affidavit that purportedly explained why the documents identified in the log
were privileged, they admitted at the hearing that this affidavit did not satisfy the
foundational requirements necessary to assert the privilege:

I want to candidly tell the Court today that as I look at the privilege log that
we attached to our moving papers here, your Honor, I don't know that it
satisfies all the foundational requirements that came out about three weeks
after we provided the privilege log. I'm referring, of course, to the Allred
decision that the Utah Supreme Court issued on October 21 st •
1

The district court provided the following explanation for this ten month delay:
I want to apologize to Counsel. We should have heard this months ago.
When a request to submit is filed without an order, it does not generally get
flagged, so it has been sitting out there for months. We didn't know about it.
I apologize.

(R. at 662).
19
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The privilege log was provided on September 30, about three weeks
before that decision came out. So I want to be candid with the Court and
indicate that I believe the privilege log certainly potentially has some issues
in terms of how complete the foundational bases for the privilege assertions
therein are ....
*
*
*
Under the Allred case, your Honor, there is no requirement of an affidavit. I
understand the plaintiffs argument here that there is a requirement for a
foundational showing. It doesn't say that that has to come in through an
affidavit or sworn testimony, and as I look at our privilege review log, I
believe that we can do a better job.

(R. at 658-59; 662-63).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court once again rejected the adequacy
of the defendants' privilege log and upheld its previous decision. As the cowt stated:
The Court believes that the defendant has the -- has to show that the
documents are privileged from the documents provided by the defendant.
The Court could not conclude and still today cannot conclude that they are
privileged. That appears to me to be the burden that the defendant has to meet
if they are not -- if the documents are not to be produced.
I've heard today Mr. Guelker claim that there are still other documents that
have not been produced on the log, that the defendant still has other
documents. The Court is affirming its prior oral ruling. The documents
identified in the 10 page log are ordered produced. If there are other
documents that should have been produced, the Court will expect those to be
produced, and the Court is not modifying its prior oral ruling.
(R. at 673-74). This ruling was followed by a formal written order, in which the district
court stated as follows:
Defendants claim that they are unable to produce many of the documents and
things requested by Dr. Vered on the grounds that the documents and things
are protected from discovery by the care/peer review privilege. However,
the court finds that defendants have failed to provide a complete privilege
log identifying those documents which defendants claim are protected by the
care/peer review privilege. They have also failed to provide a sufficient
~
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evidentiary basis that would allow the court to determine whether the
documents being withheld are subject to the care/peer review privilege.
Therefore, defendants are now precluded from asserting the care/peer review
privilege with respect to any of the documents and things requested by Dr.
Vered.
(R. at 741-44).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Defendants are appealing the district court's ruling that defendants are precluded
from withholding certain documents pursuant to Utah's peer and care review privileges.
Contrary to defendants' arguments, the district court's decision was proper and must be
upheld. The defendants must be precluded from asserting this privilege because they failed
to provide the district court with the necessary information that would have allowed the
court to determine whether the privilege applied to the documents being withheld.
Specifically, defendants admittedly failed to provide a full and complete privilege log that
identified all of the documents which defendants were actually withholding. They failed
to do so despite having over a year to create this log. Furthermore, to the extent the
defendants did identify certain documents, they failed to provide any foundational evidence
that would have allowed the district court to determine whether the documents fell within
the scope of the privilege. It was the defendants' burden to establish that the privilege
applied to the relevant documents. By failing to provide the necessary information, they
are now precluded from continuing to rely on the privilege as a basis for withholding
documents from discovery.
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ARGUMENT

I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSERTING THE PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE.
Utah Code sections 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 together establish what are commonly

referred to by the courts as the care-review and peer-review privileges. See Allred v.

Saunders, 2014 UT 43,

,r 9, 342 P.3d 204.

Section 26-25-1 allows persons and entities to

provide certain types of information to hospital "peer review committees" and "in-house
staff committee[s]" without incurring liability. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1(2)(e) and (h).
These types of information include interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, and "other
data relating to the condition and treatment of any person." Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 (1).
Section 26-25-3 provides further protection for the foregoing information by
protecting it from use in legal proceedings. It states:
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting
from those studies are privileged communications and are not subject to
discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or
character.
"Together, these sections purport to protect information compiled or created during the
peer-review or care review process from both discovery and receipt into evidence." Allred,
2014 UT 43 at ,r 9. This statutory privilege has also been incorporated into Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits the discovery or admission of any
information "provided during and created specifically as part" of the care review or peer
review process. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l); Allred, 2014 UT 43 at ,r 12.
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The Utah Supreme Court has also held that "there is danger in construing the peer
review privilege too broadly." Benson v. IH.C. Hosp., Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah
1993). For that reason, it has determined that the privilege "protects only those documents
'prepared specifically to be submitted for review purposes."' Wilson v. IH. C. Hosp., Inc.,

2012 UT 43, ,r 114,289 P.3d 369 (quoting Benson, 866 P.2d at 540 (alteration in original)).

"It does not extend to documents that 'might or could be used in the review process."' Id.
(quoting 866 P.2d at 540 (alteration in original)). This is because "any broader reading of
the rule would permit hospitals to argue that 'all medical documents prepared by hospital
personnel are created to improve health care rendered by a hospital' and are protected by
the privilege." Id. (quoting 866 P.2d at 540).
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the party asserting the care/peer review
privilege bears the burden of showing why the privilege applies to particular information.
See Benson, 866 P.2d at 540; see also Allred, 2014 UT 43 at

,r 25 (Rule 26 "places the

burden on the party asserting a privilege to establish that the material sought is protected
from discovery"). Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "to establish the
existence of the care review privilege, the party asserting the privilege must provide an
'adequate evidentiary basis, to show that the documents were 'prepared specifically to be

submitted for review purposes.'" Wilson, 2012 UT 43 at ,r 115 (emphasis added); see also
Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2005 UT App 352, ,r 15, 121 P.3d 74

("it is 'incumbent upon counsel to establish the evidentiary basis necessary for the trial
court to make its determination of the issue of [peer review] privilege.'"). "). In fact, the
23
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Court in Benson noted that the evidentiary basis for determining whether the peer review
privilege applied in that case was lacking because "only bald assertions [had] been made
... that the documents [were] nonprivileged medical records ... [or] that the documents
were compiled only for in-house review purposes and hence are privileged." 866 P .2d at
538.
In Allred, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that that "[p]arties routinely provide
privilege logs when asserting that particular documents are privileged from discovery"
because "[ s]uch logs allow the party seeking discovery to assess the claim of privilege and
object when appropriate." 2014 UT 43 at ,r 26. Accordingly, the Court implemented the
following procedure for parties asserting the peer review privilege:
[R]ather than requiring in camera review in every instance, our rules
contemplate that a party seeking to withhold relevant, but arguably
privileged, material from discovery will prepare and produce a privilege log
sufficient to allow the opposing party to evaluate the claim of privilege. The
opposing party may then raise any objections to the asserted privilege and
the district court may undertake in camera review when, in its sound
discretion, it deems such a review necessary to properly evaluate whether the
documents or items withheld from discovery qualify for the privilege.

Id. at ,r 26. The Court also "emphasize[d] that a proper privilege log must provide sufficient
foundational information for each withheld document or item to allow an individualized
assessment as to the applicability of the claimed privilege." Id. at ,r 27.
As will be shown more fully below, the defendants in this case have admittedly
failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to avail themselves of the peer/care review
privilege. They have admittedly failed to provide a full and complete privilege log that
24
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provides adequate foundation for the privilege. Therefore, the district court properly
denied the defendants' attempts to withhold documents pursuant to the privilege.
II.

DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE A FULL AND COMPLETE
PRIVILEGE LOG.

In their opening brief, the defendants' arguments focus solely on the district court's
finding that defendants failed to provide an affidavit or some other evidentiary support to
support their privilege claim. However, defendants actually failed to meet their burden in
a more fundamental way. They admittedly failed to provide a full and complete privilege
log that identified each and every document being withheld. They failed to do so despite
having eighteen months between the time Dr. Vered initially served his discovery requests
and the time their motion for reconsideration was heard. Therefore, the district court
properly determined that defendants are not entitled to avail themselves of the care/peer
review privilege.
As explained more fully above, a party asserting the care/review privilege is
required to "prepare and produce a privilege log sufficient to allow the opposing party to
evaluate the claim of privilege." Allred, 2014 UT 43 at

,r 26.

The log "must provide

sufficient foundational information for each withheld document or item to allow an
individualized assessment as to the applicability of the claimed privilege." Id. at ,r 27. In
this case, the defendants' privilege log does not even list each document or item being
withheld, much less provide any foundation that explains why the document is privileged.
For example, defendants admit that their log "does not contain all the documents in Dr.
25
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Vered's credentialing and quality file, let alone all responsive but privileged documents."
(R. at 448). Rather, defendants claim that their log is simply an "accurate representation
of the types of privileged documents that are in Dr. Vered's credentialing and quality file
and some other privileged documents that are, absent a privilege, responsive to Dr. Vered's
discovery." (Id.). In fact, the district court specifically found that "defendants have failed
to provide a complete privilege log identifying those documents which defendants claim
are protected by the care/peer review privilege." (R. at 742-43).
The defendants bore the burden of establishing that the materials requested by Dr.
Vered were protected from discovery by the care/peer review privilege. See Allred, 2014
UT 43 at ii 25. Instead of meeting this burden, defendants chose to produce an incomplete
privilege log that contained only a sampling of the documents they were withholding. This
clearly does not satisfy the defendants' burden, as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court.
Therefore, this Court must uphold the district court's decision regarding defendants'
privilege claim.

Ill.

THE
DISTRICT
COURT
PROPERLY
DETERMINED
THAT
DEFENDANTS WERE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN EVIDENTIARY
BASIS FOR THEIR PRIVILEGE CLAIM.
Throughout their brief, defendants argue that if they had known that they would be

required to submit an affidavit showing why the documents identified in their privilege log
were privileged, they would have done so prior to the October 6, 2014 hearing on Dr.
Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues. However, this is simply an after-the-fact argument
that is being made to justify defendants' dilatory conduct. This is because defendants
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should have been aware of their obligations based on Utah court decisions which have
consistently held that a party invoking the peer review privilege must provide an
evidentiary basis for claiming the privilege. See Wilson, 2012 UT 43 at

,r

115 ("party

asserting the privilege must provide an 'adequate evidentiary basis' to show that the
documents were 'prepared specifically to be submitted for review purposes."'); Cannon,
2005 UT App 352 at ,r 15 ("it is 'incumbent upon counsel to establish the evidentiary basis
necessary for the trial court to make its determination of the issue of privilege."'). In fact,
defendants cited the Wilson and Cannon decisions in one of the "meet and confer" letters
that were exchanged between the parties prior to the hearing. (R. at 466-69).
Defendants also argue that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allred, which was
published after the October 6, 2014 hearing, somehow alleviated the evidentiary burden
they needed to meet in order to claim the privilege. However, Allred did not change or
alleviate the need for one claiming the review privilege to provide an adequate evidentiary
basis for the privilege. To the contrary, the Allred decision actually confirmed the Supreme
Court's previous ruling in Wilson that a party claiming the peer review privilege must
provide some evidence showing that the documents being withheld fall within the
privilege. As the Supreme Court stated:
We emphasize that a proper privilege log must provide sufficient
foundational information for each withheld document or item to allow an
individualized assessment as to the applicability of the claimed privilege ....
[T]he Hospital would need to identify each document or item withheld from
discovery and provide sufficientfoundational material to establish that each
withheld document or item was "created ... for the purpose of evaluating
27
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care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the quality of
medical care."
Allred, 2014 UT 43 at ,r 27 (emphasis added).

Moreover, the defendants failed to explain why they were unable to provide an
adequate evidentiary basis to support their privilege claim during the ten months preceding
the hearing on their motion for reconsideration. At that point, the defendants were aware
of the district court's belief that they needed to provide an evidentiary basis for the
privilege. They were also aware of the Supreme Court's decision in Allred. Despite having
this lengthy opportunity to meet their legal obligations, they still failed to satisfy their
evidentiary burden. As their counsel explained at the August 24, 2015 hearing:
I want to candidly tell the Court today that as I look at the privilege
log that we attached to our moving papers here, your Honor, I don't know
that it satisfies all the foundational requirements that came out about three
weeks after we provided the privilege log. I'm referring, of course, to the
Allred decision that the Utah Supreme Court issued on October 21 st •
The privilege log was provided on September 30, about three weeks
before that decision came out. So I want to be candid with the Court and
indicate that I believe the privilege log certainly potentially has some issues
in terms of how complete the foundational bases for the privilege assertions
therein are ....
*
*
*
Under the Allred case, your Honor, there is no requirement of an affidavit. I
understand the plaintiffs argument here that there is a requirement for a
foundational showing. It doesn't say that that has to come in through an
affidavit or sworn testimony, and as I look at our privilege review log, I
believe that we can do a better job.
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(R. at 658-59; 662-63). 2
Based on the defendants' admitted failure to satisfy the prerequisites necessary to
assert the care/peer review privilege, the district court properly ruled that defendants were
precluded from asserting the privilege. This is because the defendants denied the district
court the information it needed to delve into the substantive legal argument of whether the
documents being withheld were actually privileged.

Therefore, since defendants

completely ignored clearly established directives regarding the peer review privilege, the
district court's decision to preclude defendants from relying on the privilege was entirely
justified.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO PERFORM AN IN
CAMERA REVIEW WHERE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE AN
ADEQUATE P~VILEGE LOG.
Despite their repeated failures to provide an adequate privilege log to Dr. Vered and

the district court, the defendants nevertheless argue that the district court was obligated to
perform an in camera review of the relevant documents to determine whether they are
subject to the peer review privilege. In doing so, defendants claim that that the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Allred mandates an in camera review whenever the peer

As part of their motion for reconsideration, defendants did submit an affidavit from
Joleen Perez that purportedly explained, in broad general terms, why defendants were
withholding certain documents pursuant to the care/peer review privilege. (R. at 410-32).
However, defendants' brief does not discuss the substance of this affidavit or argue that it
satisfied the foundational requirements stated in Wilson and Allred. In light of counsel's
admission that defendants' log did not meet the necessary foundational requirements, it
appears that defendants have conceded the inadequacy of Ms. Perez's affidavit and its
deficiencies will not be discussed herein.
2
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review privilege is raised by a party, regardless of whether an adequate privilege log has
been produced. However, this argument completely misstates the relevant law.
In Allred, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine the extent to which
district courts are required to conduct in camera reviews in order to evaluate peer review
privilege claims. Contrary to defendants' argument, the Court did not require an in camera
review in all instances. Rather, it held that that "the determination of whether in camera
€j)

review is necessary lies in the sound discretion of the district court after it considers the
foundational material provided by the party seeking the privilege." 2014 UT 43 at 1 24.
The Court then went on to discuss the type of foundational material that a party claiming
the privilege must provide before an in camera review can take place:
Parties routinely provide privilege logs when asserting that particular
documents are privileged from discovery. Such logs allow the party seeking
discovery to assess the claim of privilege and object when appropriate.
Accordingly, rather than requiring in camera review in every instance, our
rules contemplate that a party seeking to withhold relevant, but arguably
privileged, material from discovery will prepare and produce a privilege log
sufficient to allow the opposing party to evaluate the claim of privilege. The
opposing party may then raise any objections to the asserted privilege and
the district court may undertake in camera review when, in its sound
discretion, it deems such a review necessary to properly evaluate whether the
documents or items withheld from discovery qualify for the privilege.
We emphasize that a proper privilege log must provide sufficient
foundational information for each withheld document or item to allow an
individualized assessment as to the applicability of the claimed privilege.
2014 UT 43 at if 26-27.

In this case, the district court did not err when it refused to perform an in camera
review because it never received adequate "foundational material" from the defendants.
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2014 UT 43 at

if

24. It never received a "proper privilege log" containing "sufficient

foundational information for each withheld document or item to allow an individualized
assessment" of the privilege. Id. at ,I 27. As such, the district court was unable to assess
whether an in camera review was even justified. In other words, parties cannot demand an

in camera review when they have failed to satisfy their initial burden of providing
sufficient foundational evidence. Since the defendants' privilege logs admittedly failed to
satisfy this requirement, they were precluded from requesting an in camera review.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT NEVER RULED THAT DEFENDANTS
"WAIVED" THE CARE AND PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGES.
As part of their opening brief, the defendants state that the district court concluded

that defendants had "waived" the care/peer review privilege. This is untrue and is a gross
mischaracterization of the district court's ruling. The district court never once used the
words "waive" or "waiver" in any of its oral or written rulings. Rather, its rulings were
based on its finding that defendants had failed to meet the evidentiary burden necessary to
invoke the privilege.
At the conclusion of the October 6, 2014 hearing, the district court stated its
reasoning for ruling in favor of Dr. Vered on the privilege issue:
The Court is ordering that all of the discovery requested is ordered produced.
The defendants have 14 days to produce that. The Court is finding that there
has not been an adequate evidentiary basis to show that the documents
were specifically prepared to be submitted for the review purposes, and is
ordering that all of the documents be produced.
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(R. at 935) (emphasis added). The district court ruled similarly at the conclusion of the
August 24, 2015 hearing:
The Court believes that the defendant has the -- has to show that the
documents are privileged from the documents provided by the defendant.
The Court could not conclude and still today cannot conclude that they are
privileged. That appears to me to be the burden that the defendant has to meet
if they are not -- if the documents are not to be produced.
I've heard today Mr. Guelker claim that there are still other documents that
have not been produced on the log, that the defendant still has other
documents. The Court is affirming its prior oral ruling. The documents
identified in the 10 page log are ordered produced. If there are other
documents that should have been produced, the Court will expect those to be
produced, and the Court is not modifying its prior oral ruling.
(R. at 673-74).
The foregoing oral rulings were followed by a formal written order, in which the
district court stated as follows:
{fj

Defendants claim that they are unable to produce many of the documents and
things requested by Dr. Vered on the grounds that the documents and things
are protected from discovery by the care/peer review privilege. However,
the court finds that defendants have failed to provide a complete privilege
log identifying those documents which defendants claim are protected by the
care/peer review privilege. They have also failed to provide a sufficient
evidentiary basis that would allow the court to determine whether the
documents being withheld are subject to the care/peer review privilege.
Therefore, defendants are now precluded from asserting the care/peer review
privilege with respect to any of the documents and things requested by Dr.
Vered.
(R. at 741-44).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the district court never once determined that
defendants had waived the care/peer review privilege. Rather, the district court determined
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the defendants failed to properly invoke the privilege based on their inability to provide an
adequate privilege log with foundational support. In others words, the court found that
defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the privilege even applies to the
relevant documents. See Allred, 2014 UT 43 at ,I 25. (The party asserting the care/peer
review privilege has the burden to establish that the material sought is protected from
discovery).
It necessarily follows that in order for a court for find that a waiver of a privilege
has occurred, it must first determine that the claimed privilege even applies. As courts
have explained:
The party invoking a privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the
privilege has been properly invoked .... Once the invoking party has made
the appropriate proffer, then the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure
to set forth facts showing that disclosure should be compelled either because
the privilege has been waived or because an exception to the privilege
applies.
Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian, 119 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal

quotations and alterations omitted.
In this case, the district court was never required to determine whether the
defendants waived the care/peer review privilege.

This is because it was unable to

determine whether the privilege even applied. Therefore, defendants' argument regarding
the issue of waiver have no application to the district court's decision.
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VI.

DR. VERED OFFERED TO MEET AND CONFER WITH DEFENDANTS.
Finally, defendants argue that the district court's decision must be overruled because

Dr. Vered never attempted to meet and confer with defendants in person or by telephone
prior to filing his Statement of Discovery Issues. This is untrue. On June 18, 2014, Dr.
Vered' s attorney sent a detailed letter to opposing counsel outlining all of the reasons why
Dr. Vered believed that the defendants' discovery responses were deficient. (R. at 47681 ). A letter was appropriate given the statutory analysis that needed to be done in order
to address defendants' responses. Nevertheless, Dr. Vered's counsel concluded the letter
by stating "I hope we may be able to resolve the aforementioned objections without court
order. Please feel free to give me a call if you would like to discuss your objections in
more detail." (R. at 480).
Defendants' counsel never accepted Dr. Vered's invitation to a phone call. Rather
defendants' counsel responded with his own letter that defended his prior objections. (R.
at 466-69). Therefore, it is insincere for defendants to now argue that Dr. Vered never
attempted to resolve the relevant issues by phone.
It is also insincere for defendants to rely on strict interpretations of the rules when
they had previously failed to provide a privilege log as part of their initial discovery
responses, as they were required to do. Instead, defendants waited seven months, and only
after Dr. Vered filed a motion, to provide any sort of log. In fact, the relevant issue does
not involve a good faith dispute as to whether a document or item is subject to discovery.
Rather, it involves defendants' utter disregard of the requirements necessary to invoke the
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peer review privilege. It involves their refusal to provide a sufficient privilege log even
though Utah courts have clearly established the need to produce such a log. Defendants'
reliance on Rule 37 is simply an after-the-fact argument that is being made to justify their
own dilatory conduct. As such, the Rule does not provide a basis upon which to overturn
the district court's decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Vered respectfully requests this Court to uphold the
district court's ruling on Dr. Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues.
DATED this 18 th day of May, 2016.
JENSON & GUELKER, PLLC
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